Monthly Archives: September 2011

Speed? It’s drivers that kill – not cars!

Symbol used for motorways in the United Kingdom.

70mph OR 80mph?

The Department of Transport has announced a consultation on increasing the motorway speed limit in England and Wales from 70mph to 80mph (bbc.co.uk). As soon as the announcement was made, vociferous opinion on both sides of the debate for and against were forthcoming.

But, are there actually any real benefits to the proposal or, is it simply a mindless and stupid as far as road safety is concerned?

The public sector news website publicservice.co.uk (like several others) have, in a mostly balanced and apolitical piece, almost dismissed the idea as little more than a political gimmick…

They [Govt] could be accused of grandstanding before the Conservative Party conference kicks off, but the government has announced that the Department of Transport will look into whether to increase the speed limit on motorways in 2013 from 70mph to 80mph. The idea has already been dismissed as an empty gesture that will benefit no-one…(Read more)

Dependant upon which side of the debating carriageway you sit, it would appear there are many valid arguments both for and against the proposal. A factor that would tend to add evidence to the allegation that it’s simply a platitude to placate general public opinion, one designed simply to court public popularity, and gain votes.

“…There are good reasons for making 80 the new 70, and good reasons not to…” (Prof. Stephen Glaister, RAC Foundation)

Whichever way you look at the proposal, it’s hardly one that could be considered as ‘radical’ in terms of road safety. Any genuine desire for real and positive impact upon road safety and driver behaviour requires a combination of both legislation and education. Although this proposal is (supposedly) more about economics than road safety, any realistic further reduction in the Killed & Serious Injury (KSI) statistics, requires that we address various impactors, not just speed.

Legislation such as the Road Traffic (New Drivers) Act 1995, which introduced a probationary period for newly qualified drivers was one move in the right direction. The New Drivers Act required that; if you reached six or more penalty points in that time, you would lose your licence. Then, you have to apply and pay for a new provisional licence and become a ‘learner driver’ again. Another idea could be the introduction of legislation that makes compulsory continuous driver skills development a requirement of licence retention?

Statistics show that new drivers are more likely to have an accident in the first two years after passing their test. This is because of their lack of driving experience…(direct.gov.uk)

The Pass Plus Scheme, an established training course aimed at new drivers, was also a move in the right direction. It was designed by the Driving Standards Agency (DSA) with the help of insurers and the driving instruction industry. It is designed to ”build on your skills and knowledge. It will teach you how to anticipate, plan for and deal with all kinds of hazards, to help you become a more confident driver.” Perhaps the continued driver development process could follow the format shown below?

  1. Minimum driver training period prior to test
  2. Pass test (Compulsory)
  3. Complete Pass Plus scheme within two-year probationary period (Compulsory)
  4. Undertake recognised course of Advanced Driver Training within five years of initial test (Compulsory)
  5. Take and Pass Advanced Driving Certificate (Voluntary)

As highlighted above, one of the other major factors impacting upon road safety is the ability to positively influence general driver behaviour. This aspect was traditionally the remit of Police Traffic Officers and Roads Policing Units across the country. Any regular long-distance motorist, at least those paying attention to their surroundings, will have noticed the significant reduction in police patrols on our roads infrastructure over recent years.

These police resources in real terms, have been subjected to almost terminal decline over recent years, mainly due to budgetary constraints. There is now little more than automated influence such as speed camera technology and variable speed limit schemes etc. But perhaps the motoring public are more than happy with this decline? After all, every traffic cop has noted a reply like the following when dealing with an errant motorist… “Got nothing bloody better to do? Should be out catching crooks, not picking on drivers!”

To have any real chance of effectively influencing driver behaviour there must be an active and effective enforcement patrol process. Seeing any return to previous levels of roads policing is doubtful, whether or not legislation enforcement powers are granted to Highways Agency Traffic Officers (HATO), in lieu of the now almost non-existent police resources, is als open to debate. The fact remains, without some fear of capture for breaking traffic laws, any new legislation (or change to it) is mostly superfluous in road safety terms… It’s drivers that kill, not vehicles!  

Pawing through the ashes of smouldering control

Volvo B11 Fire Engine 1938

1938 Volvo B11 Fire Engine

The headlines have said it all during the last week as politicians and the media tossed around the hot coals of the FiReControl bonfire… Reporting on the project to set up nine regional Fire & Rescue control centres for services in England, a committee of MP’s branded it a “complete failure” but that’s ok is it?

What about the reported £469m of taxpayers’ money flushed away down the toilet of political public sector incompetency, as an additional set of ‘lessons are learned’ – yet again?

According to the findings of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the scheme had “not achieved any of its objectives.” Eight of the original nine centres were still sat empty and the Department for Communities and Local Government had “fatally undermined” the project by not working properly with local fire services. The cross-party PAC also highlighted the following catalogue of major issues and errors..

  • the project was rushed, without proper understanding of costs or risks
  • the Treasury funding lacked proper scrutiny of feasibility and costs
  • contracts were awarded to companies without the necessary skills or experience
  • the IT system was never delivered
  • there was “an extraordinary failure of leadership”
  • no-one had been made accountable
  • senior staff “have carried on as if nothing had gone wrong” while continuing to work on other government projects.

Here we see another clear example of politicians and Civil Service bureaucrats believing they know better than the practitioners. Sickening, disgusting or criminal, call it what you will however, one thing it probably shouldn’t be, to anyone who has a reasonably good understanding of public sector working, is surprising.

For decades most major projects in the sector have been blighted in some way by politics, along with a good measure of inter-departmental and organisational parochialism. The Public Services Radio Communications Project (PSRCP) is another example. The project aimed to deliver the Airwave Communications Network, a public service radio system for interoperability between statutory and voluntary emergency agencies. Despite the technology being born in the early 1990′s, it didn’t actually start to roll out to the emergency services across the UK until 2005 however; it’s still one that isn’t short of some major issues.

With any major public sector project, there are always arguments about who should get the lion’s share of funds from the public purse and the required resources. Not to mention the issues born out of a good measure of inter-agency point scoring and/or senior management rivalry and self-importance. All factors that often preclude any advantages that could possibly be gleaned from advantages presented by economies of scale.

Proposals for the regionalisation of any public service delivery also brings with it massive employment hot potato considerations. That and genuine concerns around issues such as the ‘control’ and ‘ownership’ by local authorities and the service delivery to our communities. It’s also one of those sticking points which has impacted upon police regionalisation but in this case, one which the Fire Brigades Union were obviously quick to champion on behalf of their membership. 

Matt Wrack, general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union (FBU), said he welcomed the report, but added that the fallout from the project was still being felt… “It failed because ministers failed to listen to the voice of control staff and their professional representatives,” he said…(bbc.co.uk)

The Ministerial Portfolio holder at the time of the project was Rt. Hon John Prescott MP. He was also quick in attempts to distance himself from the project failures on BBC Radio 4 (21-09-11).  Obviously the FBU were incensed when Prescott tried to shift blame to their members and said; Prescott should take the blame for FiReControl failure, not firefighters

“Only a minister who doesn’t know what’s going on blames others. Prescott has no excuse. He was told by the FBU, among others. He was clearly not doing his job properly…” (CMatt Wrack)

For what it’s worth my take on the original FiReControl idea is that it was probably a worthwhile and worthy venture; if for no other reason than to reduce the number of Fiefdoms that like the police, exist within the British Fire & Rescue Service. The original idea was also likely to have been totally workable but, it was always destined to fall foul of the localism arguments and employment issues.

Margaret Hodge, who chairs the PAC, may have said the project had been “flawed from the outset” and, it may have been ”one of the worst wastes of public money for many years” however; at least she was honest enough in admitting that the issues occurred “on Labour’s watch and Labour has to take responsibility.” I have to agree with her when she said; it was also far too simplistic to suggest that, “getting rid of a bunch of politicians would provide all the answers,” it won’t.

I suppose I shouldn’t really be shocked at any of this after thirty years in the sector. After all North Yorkshire Police also failed to listen to their practitioners when closing one of their control rooms down recently, but I’ve covered that and it’s another story.

The final issue surrounding failure of major public sector projects is…If it all goes wrong at least you can blame the previous political leadership; ‘learn some more lessons’ and then get back to business as usual, just as soon as the media fuelled public opinion has cooled a little! When will we ever really learn?

Getting that smug warm feeling (again)

North Yorkshire Police

NYP Crest

I’m not one to gloat however; I really can’t help wanting to shout down the telephone … “Bloody told you so you!” I know it wouldn’t help the predicament we face in our communities and, I probably wouldn’t get an answer to my call in the first place…

The management tinkering and messing with command and control functions at North Yorkshire Police over recent years has left many incredulous, not to mention unemployed. That’s before you even start to consider the high levels of sickness and other personal impacts suffered by the staff. In addition to the people who have been continually shafted during much of the change management process, what of the service to the county? It appears that the evidence is mounting to support the fact, all you get from trying to do more with less is… Less!

North Yorkshire Police are taking twice as long as last year to answer 999 calls, as force bosses continue to try to cope with Government cuts. Figures obtained exclusively by The Press show that emergency calls to North Yorkshire Police are now being answered after nine seconds on average, up from four seconds last summer. The proportion of 999 calls answered within the target of ten seconds has fallen from 94 per cent in August 2010 to 77 per cent in August 2011…(York Press)

How long are our emergency service workers (and our society) expected to suffer at the hands of the often self-serving and lack lustre feckless muppets who call themselves managers?

It’s time the emergency services (not just the police), stop hiding behind and/or using statistical information to placate their failures. After all, the figures are usually manipulated to enhance their credibility in any case. With my knowledge of how the quoted call statistics are recorded and prepared, I suspect the actual problem at NYP is probably far worse than the FOI request (above) suggests.

The Emergency Services are supposed to provide a ’service’ to the community they ‘serve’. Often these days it appears far more is being done in the name of serving individuals within the service. A prime example are the host of non service delivery departments still in existence, and often staffed by individuals on vastly inflated salaries. People who produce sheaves of charts, graphs and management speak toilet paper, which already contains more crap than it will do after it has been used.

Effective management of any organisation, let alone a public service, requires a little more than buzzword bollocks, some carefully contrived documents and a myriad of PR feel-good stories!

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